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Far from the fair copy and the final letter sent to Grenville being identical, there are numerous differences between them. Some relate to minor changes Talbot must have made while enciphering the message; others are the result of Taylor failing to decipher it properly. Talbot admitted that he 'mangled it very much in reducing it to cypher',32 with the result that Taylor could not make sense of whole sentences and frequently had to guess particular words. In one instance, instead of deciphering the comment that the exiled French deputies 'had the highest reputation amongst their colleagues', he came up with 'those of the highest repute groan in German colleges'. In another, in the crucial paragraph on the use of resolute men who to were to 'make themselves masters' of the Directory, he failed to make sense of the statement, crucial to the conspiracy, that the action should be carried out without the knowledge of the royalists in the conseils. No doubt, with some effort the main thrust of Talbot's plot could be ascertained, but the context and the justification for such a programme were considerably disfigured in the deciphering process.
The letter to Grenville appears to demonstrate Talbot's enthusiasm for the conspiracy in November I797 and, according to Sparrow, this was confirmed by his letter to Taylor. In reality, however, Talbot was trying to play down his plan to Taylor. Far from writing that it was of great consequence, he actually wrote that 'it was of no great consequence'.33 Thus, not only is the evidence for Grenville understanding the full implications of Talbot's conspiracy weak, but there is also strong evidence that at this stage Talbot himself did not take the plot very seriously. Talbot appealed to Taylor in November I797 because he realized that Grenville might regard him as foolish for proposing such a reckless scheme and thus not fit to be trusted in sensitive areas of diplomacy. It is noteworthy that Talbot may have begun to have second thoughts even while enciphering his letter to Grenville: in the fair copy he gave himself the credit for devising the plan; in the cipher copy he attributes the plan to 'Count Reventlau', possibly a code name behind which hid a French royalist.34 Nevertheless, the plot had been planted in Talbot's mind; his havering suggests his intellectual vulnerability to proposals of extreme political measures, to which subsequently he was to be introduced when he arrived in Swabia. 29 Sparrow's belief that Grenville supported the plot from late 1797 is based completely on her interpretation of these letters; there is no other corroborating evidence. It is clear, however, that these letters cannot be used in the way she wishes. The most that can be said is that Talbot sent Grenville the outlines of a conspiracy which he himself soon repudiated and that Grenville probably read a somewhat garbled version of the plot. There is no evidence to suggest that Grenville's silence hid a determination to assist in the assassination of the Directory. Thus Sparrow's view that there was a year-long conspiracy, officially sanctioned by the British government, cannot be sustained. This, of course, has serious implications bor a proper understanding of Talbot It is possible, indeed likely, that this blow was a reference to the same plan Talbot had sent to Grenville in November, although it was now framed within a much broader and more conventional strategy of overthrow, with no reference to the members of the conseils being kept in the dark. It thus appeared to have the character of a coup d'etat or journee rather than a coup de main. Wickham, however, made no further comment on it in his analysis, which suggests not only that he had no inkling that Grenville had previous knowledge of a plot, but also that Talbot had not referred to it in his debriefing. If, as Sparrow claims, Grenville was supporting the plot at this stage, it seems strange that he had not discussed it earlier with his main foreign policy adviser. Nor is there any evidence that the British government subsequently asked the emigres directly for more details, as had been offered in the reports.
During this era a 'blow' was often used as a loose translation of the French phrase coup de main, which was also frequently to be found untranslated in English usage. But did it explicitly refer to assassination? Coup de main was usually used in a military context, to depict a sudden or surprise attack or raid. Nevertheless, the fact remains that in the few despatches Grenville sent to Talbot -he sent only six in 1798, compared with the thirty-four he received from Talbot -he did not explicitly order Talbot to refrain from involvement in the various plots put up by the royalists within France. From his perspective, Grenville probably did not feel the need to do more than briefly remind Talbot of his original instructions, which he did, twice, and with some asperity.78 After all, there was no expectation in I798 that Austria would resume the war and therefore no immediate opportunity to resurrect the grand plan. From Talbot's perspective, however, the absence of a specific response from the foreign office could be interpreted as silent acquiescence in his schemes, which were not premised on Austrian intervention but assumed success to be achievable by internal convulsions alone.79
Of most importance would have been London's failure to comment on Talbot's decision to send the ,Io,ooo to Paris. Why the significance of this action was not picked up can only be surmised. Perhaps Grenville assumed the money was being spent only on intelligence-gathering, which was the original intention, or perhaps he was confused by Talbot's various requests for money, for the despatches usually never made clear whether Talbot was seeking to finance operations in Switzerland or in France. Sparrow's own interpretation suggests that this sort of confusion was possible at the foreign office. She has claimed that Talbot's request in lateJuly for bills of exchange or access to credit facilities, as the 'crisis may occur soon', related only to Paris, and that Grenville agreed to supply the money with that destination in mind, yet Talbot's appeal was decidedly ambiguous, coming in the context of his assertion that he had lost no opportunity of forwarding Britain's policy both in France (not Paris specifically) and in Switzerland. The money that he reported as having deposited in Lyon, 'in case of any important demand', could just as easily have been transferred across the frontier to Switzerland as back to Paris. 80 Responsibility for these misunderstandings as late as August and September must lie partly with Grenville. In extenuation, he was distracted by events in Hamburg, which had suddenly become a hotbed of intrigue and espionage, filled with exiled Irish rebels.81 He was also in the process of breaking off negotiations for an alliance with Austria and thus the grand plan of an Austrian invasion of France in conjunction with widespread insurrections in the French interior -which remained, in London's eyes, the framework of the French part of Talbot's mission -was not in the forefront of his mind. 82 Canning too, perhaps, must share some of the blame. In-coming despatches arrived first on his desk; he was responsible for deciphering and for preparing the official post for Grenville. Of the plot itself, Talbot boldly informed Grenville:
The mode proposed for its execution whenever matters shall be sufficiently mature is to assemble in the vicinity of the metropolis but so dispersed as not to occasion any suspicion of their intention, the body of men destined for the coup de main. They are not to be suffered to enter Paris for fear of accidents more than four and twenty hours before the time appointed for employing them. Should they succeed in making away with the Directory it is then the intention to have the tocsin sounded to assemble the sections, declare the King and despatch couriers immediately into all departments; to abolish the councils without delay and vest the government in a commission of four persons who shall exercise it in the name of the King until the arrival of His Majesty. Talbot, on the other hand, was to claim in mitigation that the plan he undertook to finance 'differed in few particulars except in its immediate consequences from what was meditated before 4 September 1797 '. 106 Whether he truly believed this remains moot, for in reality there were very substantial differences between Wickham's grand plan and Talbot's. In particular, the abandonment of the moderates in the conseils and their replacement in the plan by a group of assassins not only altered the character of the proposed explosion in Paris, changing it from a 'legal' political coup to a potential bloodbath, but also left the constitutional monarchists and other moderates out in the cold. Wickham's plan involved incorporating all political elements in opposition to the Directory; Talbot's excluded all but the extreme left and the extreme right. This greatly increased the risk of a successful insurrection ultimately falling into the hands of the Jacobins.
Moreover, Britain's underground strategy within revolutionary France was always premised on a conjunction with external war and the prospect of an Austrian, or coalition, invasion of French territory. Although Talbot subsequently claimed that he was preparing for the moment when there would be 'a speedy renewal of hostilities', in reality he had acknowledged earlier that 'this project does not seem to depend solely upon the recommencement of hostilities'.1"0 Throughout his mission Talbot had consistently argued that 'any shock in the interior of France ultimately tends to produce a favourable change'. 108 In the event, there were few immediate untoward consequences from this episode. Sir Sidney Smith's 'Julie Caron' network continued to send regular and useful intelligence from Paris during the period of the second coalition. 109 The Swabian agents, after their bellows of indignation had died down, were soon again offering assistance to Wickham when he returned to the continent inJuly 1799. But the concept of assassination as a viable political tool had taken root among the pur royalists and was to be resurrected, with disastrous consequences, when the war was renewed in I803 and a more malleable minister, Lord Hawkesbury, was sitting in the foreign office. It was the product of a raging despair among the extreme royalists and of the success of Bonaparte's policy of inveigling emigres back to France during the period of peace.
Remarkably, there was no financial loss to the government as a result of Talbot's adventures. All the money that he had illegally raised and transferred to France was eventually returned. It was subsequently discovered that a profit had been made from accrued interest and fluctuations in the exchange rate, which suggests that Talbot's continued confidence in the royalists' rectitude was not totally naive.11" Grenville, aware that the reputations of his family and the foreign office were at stake, and no doubt feeling pangs of guilt for having left his kinsman alone, unsupported and prey to the wiles and rivalries of the pur royalists in a hostile environment, soon transferred Talbot to Sweden, initially as secretary of legation but subsequently as envoy extraordinary.1l 
